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September 11, 2001 altered the way the US political elite talk about immigration and national 
security. In the years since, asylum seekers in particular have become framed in progressively 
negative ways. Simultaneously, the US has steadily increased militarization measures at its 
Southern border. A similar case, in which negative framings of asylum seekers is coupled with 
increased border militarization practices, is also seen in Australia in the years following the 
August 2001 Tampa Crisis. Based on these similar trajectories in the two countries since 2001, 
this thesis strives to answer the question: how does the framing of asylum seekers by the political 
elite in the US and Australia influence the militarization of borders in each country? I use 
detailed case studies to support the argument that framings of asylum seekers by the political 
elite contribute to justifying border militarization in the US and Australia. Each case study 
analyzes the prominent framings of asylum seekers by the political elite and considers the roles 
of the framings in the justification of increased border militarization observed between 2001 and 
2018. By comparing the two case studies, the thesis reveals significant commonalities in the 
types of framings used by the political elite when talking about incoming asylum seekers. The 
comparison of the cases also produces new questions for future exploration of the relationship 
between framing and border militarization. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
  The year 2001 marked the major events of 9/11 in the United States and the Tampa 
Crisis in Australia. In the years since, scholars have recognized the two events as critically 
altering perceptions of and responses to incoming immigrants in each country (Wright 2014, 
Holmes and Keith 2007). One implication of these post-2001 changes is the progressively 
negative framing of asylum seekers by the political elite in both the US and Australia. In the US, 
groups of immigrants entering at the Southern border have been specifically affected by these 
negative framings. While many are asylum seekers fleeing persecution, they continue to be 
described by the political elite as illegal, and as an uncontrollable “flood” bringing drugs and 
crime. More recently, they have been labeled as a “migrant caravan” by the political elite within 
the Trump Administration. Australia shares this trajectory of increasingly negative framings of 
asylum seekers in the period following 2001. In the Australian case, these framings have most 
prominently affected asylum seekers entering by boat at the country’s maritime border. The 
framings of asylum seekers by the Australian political elite mirror the US case, with dominant 
framings linking asylum seekers to illegality, immorality, and threats to national security. 
In the same period of 2001-2018, the US and Australian governments each introduced 
increasingly militarized enforcement practices at their borders (Wright 2014, Windors 2007). 
Border militarization in the US has been focused primarily at the US-Mexico border and has 
been characterized by national guard deployments, military-grade weapons and technologies, and 
increases in the size and sophistication of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). In Australia, the 
government has militarized its maritime borders through naval operations, military technology, 
and interdiction strategies. 9/11 and the Tampa Crisis are recognized as catalysts for the 
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increases in border militarization and negative framings of asylum seekers in the period between 
2001 and 2018. However, whether there is a relationship between the framings of asylum seekers 
and border militarization which could account for their parallel trajectories in the US and 
Australia in the last 17 years remains unclear.  
Based on the common features between the two countries, this thesis asks: how does 
framing of asylum seekers by the political elite influence the militarization of borders in the US 
and Australia? Through case studies evaluating dominant framings of asylum seekers by the 
political elite, I argue that the framings contribute to justifying border militarization in the US 
and Australia. I consider 1) the increase in border militarization in the US and Australia in the 
period of 2001 - 2018, 2) the prominent framings of asylum seekers by the political elite in each 
country and 3) the ways that those framings contribute to justifying border militarization. 
 In this introductory chapter, I thoroughly detail my argument and outline my 
methodology.  In Chapter 2, I review existing literature on the concepts of framing and border 
militarization, including their application in the specific contexts of the US and Australia. I also 
include the definition of an asylum seeker and discuss how asylum seekers are legally 
differentiated from other types of immigrants in each country. Chapter 3 is the case study of the 
United States. It overviews the increased militarization of the US -Mexico border in the last 17 
years and identifies prominent framings of asylum seekers by the political elite. In discussing the 
framings, I support that the framing of asylum seekers by the US political elite contributes to 
justifying the militarization of the Southern border. Chapter 4 analyzes the Australian case in a 
similar manner. The concluding chapter of the thesis considers key similarities and differences 
between the two cases and their implications. I will highlight the central findings of the research 
as well as the questions raised by this thesis for future exploration. 
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Argument and Approach  
I argue that the framing of asylum seekers by the political elite contributes to the 
justification of border militarization in the US and Australia. I support the argument through case 
studies in which I consider border militarization and analyze framings of asylum seekers in each 
country. In each case study, I describe the increase in border militarization in the period between 
2001 and 2018. Militarization is shown to increase over time based on the increase in border 
control size and funding, the use of military equipment and strategies by border control agencies, 
the militaristic nature of asylum detention centers, and the presence of military personnel at the 
border. The framings of asylum seekers by the political elite in both countries include portrayals 
of asylum seekers as national security threats, immoral and illegal. The two cases also share 
framings in which asylum seekers are associated with human smugglers and are described as 
“flooding” through the border. The analyses in each case study also address framings specific to 
each country, including connecting asylum seekers to drugs and the “migrant caravan” in the US 
and labeling asylum seekers as “boat people” and “queue jumpers” in Australia.  
 The United States and Australia serve as effective case studies due to their key 
commonalities in framings, militarization measures, and timelines. Each is an industrialized 
Western democracy which has a long and politicized history with immigration (Grewcock 2009, 
Andreas 2009, Dixon 1945, Winders 2007). They are also each independent of supranational 
institutions, such as the EU, which may limit full state autonomy in the immigration decisions of 
other countries. Both the US and Australia have legal structures in place for refugee resettlement, 
carried out by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as asylum routes 
available for people who claim to meet the definition of a refugee and who enter the country 
directly to apply for asylum rather than registering with UNHCR and being resettled (Bohmer 
and Shuman 2007, Hartley and Pederson 2015). Compared to other means by which asylum 
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seekers enter the countries, the US and Australia particularly problematize undocumented 
physical entry. The political elite do not apply the same negative framings to asylum seekers who 
enter via air transportation or at an established port of entry. As a result, asylum seekers entering 
without authorization at the US Southern border and entering Australian waters by boat without 
authorization are talked about and treated in unique ways. 
Methodology 
 In this thesis, I use case studies of the US and Australia to critically analyze the framing 
of asylum seekers by the political elite. I focus on how the prominent framings of asylum seekers 
contribute to justifying increased militarization of specific borders in each country.  
To identify prominent framings of asylum seekers by the political elite, I analyze sources 
in which the political elite comment on asylum seekers and/or the border, both directly and 
indirectly. The selected sources include official publications released and circulated by the 
government, press releases, transcripts of interviews and speeches, and direct quotes printed by 
major news outlets. I focus specifically on the framings of asylum seekers presented by members 
of the political elite whose rhetoric is most widely distributed and who most frequently discuss 
asylum and border issues. In the US, these people include the President, Secretary of Homeland 
Security, Secretary of Defense, and various officials within the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and white house staff. In the Australia case study, I analyze framings by the 
Prime Minister, Minister of Immigration, and Minister of Home Affairs. 
I use existing academic literature and information released by government agencies and 
credible news sources as evidence of increasing border militarization in the US and Australia 
between 2001 and 2018. Because militarization efforts are rarely labeled “militarization efforts” 
by state actors, I consider efforts relating to border enforcement and determine whether they 
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constitute militarization based on a set of criteria. These criteria include: 1) the political elite 
stressing the use of force and threat of violence as the most appropriate response to asylum 
seekers entering at the border, 2) the use of military-grade equipment, technology, training and 
strategies at the borders, 3) the presence of military personnel at the border.1  
My focus is on framing and militarization occurring between 2001 and 2018. 2001 
encompasses two major events which produced changes in framings of asylum seekers and 
border militarization in the two countries. In Australia, late August 2001 marks the occurrence of 
the “Tampa Affair,” in which the Norwegian ship MV Tampa, carrying 433 asylum seekers 
rescued from a capsized Indonesian boat, was denied permission to enter Australian territory. 
The event is recognized as being crucial to the contemporary relationship between Australia and 
asylum seekers arriving by boat (Wright 2014). On September 11, 2001, only weeks after the 
Tampa Affair, the deadly terror attacks on the World Trade Center drastically changed US 
international engagement and perceptions of immigration. While the hijackers involved in the 
attack entered the country through legal visa routes, all types of immigration into the United 
States have since been affected by the security fears brought on by the attack. Both the Tampa 
Affair and September 11 are cited in the literature as crucial moments for asylum policy and 
practice in the two countries. Because of the significance of 9/11 and the Tampa Crisis in each 
country, 2001 serves as an appropriate point from which to begin analyzing the framing of 
asylum seekers as a contributing factor to justifying border militarization in the US and 
Australia.   
                                               
1 My criteria items are adapted from Kraska’s (2007) definition of militarization and Jones and Johnson’s 
(2016) definition of border militarization. These definitions are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
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Conclusion 
 In this introduction to the thesis, I state my research question, discuss my argument, and 
describe the methodology I use. In the following chapter, I further discuss the key concepts of 
framing and border militarization and expand on the definition and actual process of asylum-
seeking. The concepts of framing and border militarization are critical to understanding the case 
studies carried out in this thesis. The case studies and the thesis as a whole illustrate that the 
framing of asylum seekers by the political elite in the US and Australia contribute to justifying 
border militarization in each country..   
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Chapter 2: Key Concepts and Definitions 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I discuss the concepts of framing and border militarization, which are 
central to understanding the case studies of the US and Australia. I begin reviewing existing 
research on framing and its effects before turning to academic literature on framing in the 
specific contexts of the US and Australia. I then consider how previous research has defined and 
discussed border militarization. Following the literature review, I provide the definition of an 
asylum seeker and clarify the distinctions between asylum seekers, resettled refugees, and other 
types of immigrants. The chapter provides a conceptual basis for understanding the case studies I 
will undertake in the following two chapters. 
Literature Review 
 Framing  
 Framing is broadly understood in the social sciences as the means by which information 
is presented. Gamson and Modgliani (1987) define a “frame” as a prominent organizing idea or 
story line that provides meaning to events and weaves a connection among them. Framing is 
central to understanding public attitudes towards policies and issues, and has been a key 
mechanism for shaping public opinion. Nelson and Kinder (1996) describe framing as a way of 
teaching citizens how to think about and understand complex social policy problems. In 
particular, they argue that public opinion is group-centric in that it is strongly influenced by 
attitudes toward particular social groups (Nelson and Kinder 1996). Framing is crucial to 
understanding the success and failure of policy initiatives. 
Framing by the Political Elite  
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  Prior research has identified the political elite as those actors holding the power to 
influence the public through framing (Flores 2018, Druckman 2001, Druckman et al. 2013). 
Academics generally consider the “political elite” to include politicians, political candidates, 
party leaders, and other prominent government and political figures (Druckman and Nelson 
2003, Van Aelst and Walgrave 2016). Because the literature recognizes framing put forth by this 
group as particularly influential, this thesis and the analysis in the following chapters will focus 
on the framing of asylum seekers presented by members of the political elite in the US and 
Australia. This section will serve to provide an understanding of how framing by the political 
elite influences the development of policies and state actions. 
Framing by the political elite has the ability to reach the masses through media and 
communication outlets. It thus garners significant influential quality (Flores 2018). Studies have 
shown that the effects of elite framing change with context, producing different levels of 
influence when the atmosphere in which the framing is presented is highly polarized, such as in 
partisan debates (Druckman et al. 2013). These studies suggest that framing of asylum seekers by 
the political elite would be influential when their opinions are widely shared and the topic is 
politically salient. Between 2001 and 2018, means of communication and information sharing 
through technology, news outlets, and social media made statements by the political elite widely 
available to the public. Additionally, immigration and border control grew as a  highly 
politicized topic subject to partisan arguments in the American and Australian political scenes 
(Flores 2018, Lueck et al. 2015). 
Framing by political elites is a central component of the theory of symbolic politics, in 
which symbols used in political expressions dictate public responses. According to the theory, 
responses to symbolic expressions are based on predispositions people typically develop early in 
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life (Sears 1993). For example, most of the US public would be expected to respond negatively 
to something compared to Nazism in framing by the political elite because of a predisposition 
formed early in life to consider Nazis as evil. Likewise, we can anticipate a positive public 
reaction to something connected to Martin Luther King Jr. though framing based on similar 
predispositions to admire him. In the examples, Nazism and MLK Jr would be the symbols to 
which the public would have expected negative or positive reactions based on their 
predispositions. The theory explains these reaction processes while also analyzing how political 
elites utilize symbols to frame issues positively or negatively and elicit specific public responses. 
This theory of symbolic politics will be central to my analysis of framings of asylum-seekers as 
connected to drugs, crime, terrorism and as arriving in “floods” when they cross borders. 
Framing of Immigrants and Asylum Seekers   
 I now turn to an analysis of the framing of immigrants and asylum seekers. While this 
thesis will focus on the framing of asylum seekers, the case studies will reveal that important 
aspects of asylum seeker framing rely on their association with or distinction from other 
immigrant groups. For this reason, I will include brief information on the framing of immigration 
more generally in each country. I will also discuss the framing of specific types of immigrants 
with which asylum seekers are frequently associated. Existing literature has begun to explore the 
effects of framing on immigration issues, and has found public opinion on immigration to be 
significantly impacted by framing (Flores 2018). The forms of framing used in relation to 
immigrants and asylum seekers in the United States and Australia will be central to the case 
studies and conclusions of this thesis. 
 In the US context, asylum seekers are simultaneously seen as security threats and 
economic burdens. Political elites frame asylum seekers as security threats, referencing them as 
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potential terrorists, criminals, and drug dealers, producing challenges for asylum seekers entering 
the country (Holmes and Keith 2010). Their apparent threat stems from the overall increase in 
security concerns within immigration following the events of September 11. The political elite 
also frame asylum seekers as part of the larger category of immigrants, or as one and the same 
with refugees, making the framing of asylum seekers in the US more closely tied to framing of 
other types of immigrants. As a result, asylum seekers are indirectly framed as undesirable 
through their perceived association with economically burdensome refugees and job-stealing 
undocumented migrants in the US (Dykstra-DeVette 2018, Jones-Correa 2013).  
 Framing of asylum seekers entering Australia’s sea border by boat mirror the security 
concerns present in the US. These types of asylum seekers are likewise described using the 
language of “terrorist,” reminiscent of Australia’s own history of cooperation with the US 
foreign policy initiatives of the “War on Terror” (McKay et al. 2011). These asylum seekers are 
framed by Australian officials as illegal and immoral as a result of their decision to utilize 
“people smuggling” and “jump the queue” by entering by boat to request asylum (McKay et al. 
2017, Lueck et al. 2015).  They are framed as illegitimate through their distinction from 
“legitimate” refugees waiting in camps to be resettled into Australia and through their being 
labeled by government authorities as being “boat people” carrying out “irregular migration” 
(Rowe and O’Brien 2016).  
 The framings of asylum seekers entering at physical borders in the US and Australia 
share a concern for security and protection of the country against people perceived to be 
terrorists and criminals. Despite the commonalities between the framings, there are also 
distinctions between the ways in which asylum seekers are framed in each setting. In the US, 
asylum seekers are associated in rhetoric with undocumented economic migrants and defined as 
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illegal because of that connection. Knowledge of the difference between asylum seekers and 
refugees, almost nonexistent in US discourse, is at the forefront of the Australian framing of 
asylum seekers as illegal and illegitimate “queue jumpers.” While the smuggling of asylum 
seekers across physical borders occurs in both countries, it is much more prevalent in the 
Australian discourse surrounding asylum seekers and criminalizing them through association 
with people smuggling. Societal attitudes towards asylum seekers and the government actions 
affecting them will reflect the negative portrayals of asylum seekers presented by the political 
elite in each country. With this guiding idea, my thesis will explore the effect of framing of 
asylum seekers on the militarization of borders in the US and Australia.  
Border Militarization 
Militarization is defined as the implementation of a set of beliefs, values, and 
assumptions stressing the use of force and threat of violence as the most appropriate means of 
problem-solving, particularly emphasizing military power, hardware, organization, operations, 
and technology (Kraska 2007). A prominent feature of militarization is the adoption and 
application of elements of a military model to an organization or situation in areas outside the 
traditional roles of the military (Jones and Johnson 2016, Kraska 2007). The concept was 
previously applied to understandings of the changing nature of domestic policing, particularly 
during War on Drugs and War on Terror time periods in the US (Kraska 2007, Hall and Coyne 
2013). Literature on militarization and framing alike link militarization to the framing and 
representation of the object of militarization (Kraska 2007, Jones and Johnson 2016, Hall and 
Coyne 2013, McKay et al. 2017). The “national security syndrome” refers to the framing of 
objects as national security threats to rationalize and increase levels of militarization (Klare 
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1978). Kraska (2001) also points to the use of metaphoric language to frame issues in ways 
which promote thoughts and behaviors associated with those of military paradigms.  
 In the case of border militarization, the objects against which the state is militarizing are 
immigrants and asylum seekers. The specific concept of militarization of a border, which is 
fundamental to the argument presented in this thesis, is also specifically defined in existing 
literature. The militarization of the border is defined as the characteristics of militarization 
applied to border protection strategies and taking shape in the space of a physical border. While 
most visibly recognized by the deployment of the military to border spaces, it may include the 
use of military strategies and technologies and the hiring of combat veterans for the purposes of 
border security (Jones and Johnson 2016). Border militarization also hinges upon the framing of 
a particular group against whom the nation must militarize (Jones and Johnson 2016, McKay et 
al. 2017). The existing frames of immigrants, and specifically of asylum seekers, addressed in 
the previous section serve as examples of frames classifying incoming immigrants as threats 
which legitimize the use of militarization at the borders in the United States and Australia.  
War Terminology and Militarization 
I will argue that the US framing of asylum seekers as terrorists, criminals, and drug 
dealers contributes to justifying border militarization through associations of each term to the 
“war on terror,” “war on crime” and “war on drugs.” Framings of asylum seekers in which these 
war-centric metaphors are used and normalized by the political elite produce changes in the types 
of state action against asylum seekers which the public will consider justifiable. The resulting 
justification for the mistreatment of asylum seekers allows for the militarized responses at the 
border. This thesis will employ the concepts of framing and border militarization to consider the 
specific situations of incoming asylum seekers in the US and Australia. 
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Distinguishing Asylum Seekers 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
 In the United States, resettled refugees and asylum seekers are frequently mislabeled, and 
the distinction between the two legal pathways for entering the country is unclear to many. 
Alternatively, the Australian case study reveals that the political elite and general public are 
acutely aware that a distinction between refugee resettlement and asylum seeker pathways exists. 
However, many Australians’ understanding of the nature of that distinction is skewed, and they 
view asylum seekers as less worthy of entry into the country than their resettled refugee 
counterparts.  Clear understandings of the actual definition of asylum seekers and the true 
distinction between asylum seekers and refugees is essential within this thesis. The legal 
definition of a refugee in the US and Australia is that of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees. Based on this definition, a refugee is someone who “owing to well founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (UN General 
Assembly 1951).2 
People entering a country through formal refugee resettlement and those seeking asylum 
both must meets this definition of a refugee. The process of seeking asylum requires that a 
person request asylee status once within a country or at its border. This differs significantly from 
refugees seeking resettlement, who are registered by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
                                               
2 Here I will quickly note that, although not investigated in this work, there also exist other classifications 
of displaced people, including Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who meet similar criteria as that of a 
refugee but who are displaced from their homes while remaining within their country of origin 
Caulkins  14 
(UNHCR) and often (but not always) live in a refugee camp prior to UNHCR placing them in a 
country for resettlement (Bohmer and Shuman 2007).  
The processes which a person legally classified as a refugee will experience are much 
different than that which an asylum seeker will experience. One way to consider the difference is 
to think of the refugee process as a three-state process and that of an asylum seeker as two-state. 
A refugee will flee his or her country into a second, typically neighboring country. They will 
register with UNHCR and live in a camp or, less commonly, in a town in the second country 
while they await being selected for resettlement. The wait is years, even generations, long. If a 
refugee is selected for resettlement, they do not get to choose to which country they will go. Both 
the US and Australia have rigorous procedures for vetting refugees resettled by UNHCR at every 
stage of the resettlement process. In each country, there are also specific programs for resettled 
refugees once they move to the country of resettlement (US Dept. of State n.d, Australian Human 
Rights Commission 2015).  
Alternatively, asylum seekers flee their countries of origin and request to remain in a 
second country. During the entire process, they are dealing with the government of the state in 
which they are seeking asylum rather than with the UN. They may announce that they are 
seeking asylum upon arrival at a port of entry, or may submit an asylum application from within 
the country. Their cases will be decided by immigration authorities based on whether or not they 
meet the definition of a refugee. If a case is successful, the person will remain in the country but 
will not have access to the same resources as refugees who were resettled there. If it is 
unsuccessful, they will not have legal status and may be subject to deportation. For the purposes 
of this thesis, asylum seekers will be the primary focus. Nevertheless, the framings of asylum 
seekers in each country deals intimately with the socially perceived (rather than legally exact) 
Caulkins  15 
distinctions between refugees and asylum seekers. Further, the general public in each country is 
typically unaware of the differences between asylum seekers and refugees and so confuse the 
two, an issue which is only perpetuated by inexact use of the terms by the political elite (Flores 
2018). It is important that the reader have a clear understanding of what an asylum seeker is and 
how asylum relates to the category of refugee. 
Asylum Seekers and Other Types of Immigrants  
 The nature of the asylum seeker definition lends itself to confusion and misinterpretation 
beyond that of its distinction from refugees. A likely reason for such confusion is the wide 
variety of means by which asylum seekers may enter a country prior to initiating the legal 
process of claiming asylum. Asylum seekers may enter at any port of entry in the two countries 
being considered, including air and sea in both and land borders in the US. Many enter with legal 
temporary visas for business or travel and then petition to stay, thus blurring the line between 
themselves and other migrants utilizing such visas solely for work or travel. Furthermore, asylum 
seekers may enter a country without authorization or through the use of false documentation or 
other such means. For this reason, they are often associated with other groups of unauthorized 
migrants in the two countries. These overlapping statuses and the confusion between them is 
defined by Bohmer and Shuman (2007) as the migration-asylum nexus.  
Nevertheless, asylum seekers are distinct from both visa-holding and unauthorized 
migrants. Firstly, the status of asylee is a completely legal one in both countries. Within the 
content of asylum laws, it is also legal for people to enter the countries in which they seek 
asylum by any means, including entering without authorization. However, societal stigma and 
sometimes even law enforcement action works against asylum seekers who take this route, which 
is at times the only one available to them. Secondly, asylum seekers face unique challenges upon 
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applying for asylum in the United States or Australia as they are severely limited while their 
applications are being evaluated, a process which takes months, and sometimes years. Even 
before that point, the application processes and their legal rights as an asylum seeker are often 
not made clear to them.  
Conclusions 
 Framing by government officials guides public attitudes and position on policy issues. 
Framing is central to existing understandings of militarization of borders. The themes discussed 
in this chapter serve as a conceptual basis for the case studies which I carry out in the following 
two chapters. The case studies will demonstrate that the framing of asylum seekers by the 
political elite has contributed to the justification of border militarization in both the US and 
Australia. 
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Chapter 3: US Case Study 
Introduction 
The period following the September 11 attacks shifted the framework of immigration 
policies and public sentiment toward immigrants in the United States. While none of the 
terrorists involved in 9/11 entered the country through refugee or asylum status, refugees and 
asylum seekers have since become viewed as particularly threatening (Gorman 2019, Holmes 
and Keith 2010). This was exemplified in the Bush administration’s decision to temporarily halt 
the refugee resettlement program directly following 9/11 (Schoenholtz 2005). There are various 
potential reasons for the scrutiny of refugees and asylum seekers while business, student and 
tourism visas have received little attention. One possible explanation is that the US public 
considers refugees and asylum seekers a financial drain while it expects business, tourism, and 
international student migrants to produce revenue and serve the interests of corporate America.3 
Another explanation might suggest that the US public considers the granting of refugee or asylee 
status an act of generosity and good will by the government, the exploitation of which may be 
emotionally hurtful. Contrastingly, the exploitation of a business visa would be seen as breaking 
a contract, with fewer emotional implications. The result of these or other potential reasonings is 
that specific types of asylum seekers in the US are exposed to heightened levels of scrutiny and 
mistrust (Acer 2004, Holmes and Keith 2010). 
The category of asylum seekers can be further broken down into four subgroups based on 
the means by which they enter the US. The first are people who apply for asylum immediately at 
                                               
3 The idea that refugees and asylum seekers present a drain on the economy has been discredited in 
various scholarly work and government-supported research which revealed that the presence of  refugees 
and asylum seekers has actually stimulated economies rather than burdened them. See the September 
2017 Department of Health and Human Services Study published at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/19/us/politics/document-Refugee-Report.html (last 
accessed April 14, 2019) 
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a US port of entry. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) officers interview these asylum seekers at 
the port of entry to determine whether they will be allowed to enter the country and complete the 
remainder of the asylum application process. The other three groups apply for asylum after they 
enter the country by various means. The second category of asylum seekers enter the US using a 
legal temporary visa prior to applying for asylum. The third and fourth, respectively, are those 
who enter at a port of entry with false documentation and those who enter without authorization, 
almost always by crossing the US Southern border. Most of this thesis will be applicable to 
asylum seekers in the first and fourth categories: those who initially enter at the Southern border. 
I chose to focus on the Southern border because the research question specifically concerns 
border militarization, which in the US is heavily centralized at the US-Mexico border. Those 
entering at the border with documentation, whether real or fraudulent, and later applying for 
asylum are not given comparable levels of public attention. As a result, this thesis will focus on 
only those who request asylum at the border or enter across the border without authorization.  In 
the US, the major framings of asylum seekers revolve around the border. Asylum seekers who 
enter at the border have been and continue to be the most discussed and problematized asylum 
seekers entering the country.  
I will begin the chapter describing an increase in militarization at the US Southern Border 
between 2001 and 2018. This chapter asks the questions of why such an increase in militarization 
has been able to occur and how the political elite justify continuous and increasingly severe 
border militarization practices. I will present changes in the framing of asylum seekers by the 
political elite following 9/11 as a significant contributing factor to answering those questions. By 
identifying prominent terms the political elite use to describe asylum seekers and changes in 
framings of asylum seekers over time, I will demonstrate how the political elite use framings of 
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asylum seekers to justify border militarization. I organize the section on prominent framings 
chronologically by presidential administration in order to clearly show changes to framings over 
time, as well as to articulate which framings were most consistent across the Bush, Obama, and 
Trump administrations. The sections will consider the implications of framings in relation to 
concerns of national security and connect these framings to historical “wars” in the US. The 
chapter will provide evidentiary support for concluding that the political elite use framings of 
asylum seekers to justify border militarization in the United States. 
Pre-2001 Asylum Policies and Border Practices 
The United States has a long history of welcoming immigrants, and an equally long 
history of inequality and mistreatment plaguing its immigration system. Immigration concerns 
expressed by the US public and political elite have historically included protecting American 
workers, “American values,” and an “American lifestyle.” The government has attempted to 
address those concerns through efforts to stop undocumented immigration,  promote cultural 
assimilation, and encourage immigrants to learn English (Holmes and Keith 2010, McBride 
2002). In particular instances throughout history, the US has regulated the entrance of 
immigrants based explicitly on ethnic origin, as in the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. In the midst 
of offering opportunity and genuine relief for many immigrants, the country has excluded others 
and placed them at the margins of US society.  
The US began participating in official refugee resettlement in 1980, although prior to that 
point it had already accepted refugees into the country and participated in temporary refugee 
assistance programs (Refugee Council USA n.d.). That earlier activity included accepting 
Eastern European refugees during World War II and refugees fleeing the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War. The Refugee Act of 1980 produced the current US refugee resettlement program, in 
Caulkins  20 
which the President sets an annual cap on the number of refugees who will be allowed to enter 
the country through UNHCR’s resettlement program. Since 1975, the US has accepted over 3 
million refugees through the program (US Department of State 2019). In addition to being the 
official beginning of the refugee resettlement program, 1980 marked the highest number of 
refugees accepted in a single year, with 207,116 refugees resettled. Contrastingly, and with only 
22,491 refugees resettled, 2018 marks the lowest resettlement numbers to date. Prior to 2018, the 
lowest amount recorded was in 2002, when the US resettled only 27,131 refugees following 9/11 
(US Department of State 2019).  
   The Refugee Act of 1980 also established the process of seeking asylum in the United 
States. Similar to refugee resettlement, the US had been accepting asylum seekers through 
temporary and situational programs earlier, recorded beginning in 1973. Since 1973, over 
750,000 people have been granted admission to the US as asylees (Refugee Processing Center 
2019 and US Immigration and Naturalization Service 2002). Since 1995, the annual number of 
asylum approvals has consistently been in the 20,000s and 30,000s, with a peak in 2001, when 
nearly 40,000 cases were approved. Between 1973 and  2004, those approved cases constituted 
an average 28 percent of all asylum applications the US government received.4  
The US government significantly reformed the asylum application process in 1993 during 
changes to immigration policy at large after the World Trade Center bombing. The security-
focused reforms implemented improvements in immigrant background screenings and increased 
the level of scrutiny with which immigration officers and immigrant court judges were to review 
applications. Policy reform specifically affecting asylum seekers in the years following the 1993 
bombing included the regulation that all asylum seekers must submit their asylum application 
                                               
4 Total asylum applications received, and the corresponding approval rates, cease to be made available 
in DHS records following 2004. 
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within a year of entering the country and the stipulation that asylum seekers could no longer 
apply for employment authorization while their asylum application is pending. The 1993 changes 
shifted the legal process of applying for asylum and altered the experience of asylum seekers 
living in the US. However, it was not until after 9/11 that changes to border security became 
intrinsically linked to stopping asylum seekers from entering the country. That shift began the 
process of continually increasing militarization which has taken place at the US Southern border 
since.    
Border Militarization in the US  
  Chapter 2 provided an explanation of the concept of border militarization, and this 
section will follow with a description of how border militarization is enacted and experienced in 
the context of the US-Mexico border. The first prominent characteristic of US border 
militarization is deployment of military troops to the border. While the 2018 deployments under 
President Trump were made highly visible by media sources and are currently ripest in the public 
memory, it was far from the first deployment of military forces to the border. The military was 
present on the border even as early as the 1800s, and has been a nearly continuous presence since 
the early 1900s (Matthews 2007). Joint Task Force 6, based in Texas and established in 1989 to 
serve at the border in the War on Drugs, was repurposed and renamed Joint Task Force North 
(JTF North) in 2004. The new task force permanently served at the border with a new set of 
objectives in the War on Terror. JTF North also provided military engineering expertise and 
added perimeter lighting, fencing, and vehicle barriers along the border (Matthews 2007). In 
2006, President Bush ordered the deployment of 6,000 national guard troops to the Southern 
border in Operation JUMP START (Matthews 2007). Four years later, the Obama administration 
initiated Operation Phalanx, which authorized 1,200 troops to be deployed to the border (US 
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Army 2011). In 2018 the Trump administration announced Operation Faithful Patriot and 
Operation Guardian Support. By October 2018, the two Operations had placed over 7,000 troops 
on the Southern Border (US Northern Command 2018).  
The 2018 deployment represented the largest deployment to the Southern border to take 
place in the seventeen years following September 11. It also signaled a shift in practice to further 
normalize the presence of military troops at the border. In October 2018, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) publicly eliminated the use of the name “Operation Faithful Patriot” and instead 
elected to address the National Guard involvement at the border as a continuous DOD mission at 
the border (Rempfer 2018). Removing the name signals that the deployment of troops to the 
border will no longer be presented to the public as singular events during extreme circumstances, 
but a continuous military mission.  
 In addition to the use of National Guard troops at the border, militarization has taken 
shape in the technologies and strategies used, the training and activities of non-military border 
patrol agents. In addition to increased military presence, Andreas (2009) points out that resources 
developed for military use are becoming more frequently used at the border. A primary example 
of such resources is military grade technology and equipment, including magnetic footfall 
detectors and infrared body sensors. The increase in military-grade resources has also meant an 
increase in the cost of monitoring the border (Andreas 2009). The training of border patrol 
officers to operate the military-grade equipment and to employ military-style force when 
necessary and militaristic strategizing techniques are additional indicators of increased 
militarization of the Southern border.  
 The militarization of the Southern border did not occur automatically and should not be 
considered a natural progression over time. Rather, the militarization took place through a series 
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of government actions, including the deployment of troops and the allotment of funding for CBP 
agent training and military grade equipment. Some changes in militarization were made quietly, 
without attention from news media and the general public. However, most were publicized and 
known, with varying degrees of familiarity, by the US public. The fact that the border 
militarization was publicly acknowledged raises the question of how the political actors involved 
justified militarization actions to US citizens. In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that 
the political elite have used framings of asylum seekers as one way of justifying the 
militarization of the US Southern border. 
What do the Political Elite Label Asylum Seekers? 
 The first major point to address in this discussion of how asylum seekers are framed is 
their position related to refugees. Ask any US immigration attorney and they will tell you that the 
two separate statuses, while containing shared aspects, are legally distinct from one another. Ask 
the average US citizen, however, and the most likely response will be that a difference does not 
exist or that they do not know what it is. In everyday discussion, news reports, and in the 
statements of public officials, the terms ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘refugee’ are used incorrectly and 
interchangeably (Bohmer and Shuman 2007). In some instances, either of the two terms is used 
to encompass both groups. The two groups also frequently lumped together under the single 
phrase ‘refugees and asylum seekers.’ The fact that the distinction between refugees and asylum 
seekers is unclear or nonexistent in the minds of the public makes it essential for us to consider 
the framing of asylum seekers and refugees together. This thesis must include the rhetoric 
surrounding refugees which, even when unintentional and unknown by members of the public, 
changes public opinion of people who are legally classified as asylum seekers.  
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 In addition to being frequently connected to refugees, asylum seekers entering at the 
Southern border are also frequently talked about as the same as unauthorized migrants. This 
framing holds important implications. The terms “unauthorized,” “undocumented,” and “illegal” 
cease to hold the emotional implication of humanitarian need with which the words “refugee” 
and “asylum seeker” remain charged. Rather, the terms produce feelings of a threat to public 
safety. The term “migrant” following any of those three terms additionally raises economic 
concerns to the public, propagated by the notions that unauthorized migrants in the US are taking 
jobs, draining financial resources, and avoiding taxation. As a result of this classification, some 
instances of framing discussed in this chapter may pertain to the use of the terms migrant and 
unauthorized, but only when the word is used to describe those who should actually be classified 
as asylum seekers. 
How do the Political Elite Talk About Asylum Seekers? 
On September 5, 2001, President George W. Bush concluded a state visit from Mexican 
President Vicente Fox and issued a press release outlining the five points on migration on which 
the meeting focused: a humane approach to migration issues, protection of American workers, 
fairness, the countries’ joint commitment to migration issues, and a temporary worker program. 
The statement made no mention of the phrase “border security.” While the Bush administration 
and its predecessors addressed the need to regulate the borders to limit the entrance of illegal 
drugs into the country, migration was not frequently coupled with security rhetoric, but rather a 
focus on employment regulation. White house press releases in the weeks following the state 
visit from President Fox indicate that September 11 shifted that focus. On September 15, 2001, 
when President Fox spoke on the phone to President Bush, he expressed solidarity with the 
United States and  expressed a commitment to border security in the US effort to fight against 
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terrorism. On October 4, 2001, the Mexican President was back in Washington DC discussing 
border security with President Bush.  
October 2001 also marked the official establishment of the Department of Homeland 
Security. The agency’s mission was stated as follows: “The mission of the Office will be to 
develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the 
United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The Office will coordinate the executive branch's 
efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist 
attacks within the United States” (The White House Office of Homeland Security & the 
Homeland Security Council 2001). One of the specific actions stated for the purpose of 
achieving that mission was to “coordinate efforts to improve the security of United States 
borders... in order to prevent acts of terrorism within the United States” (The White House Office 
of Homeland Security & the Homeland Security Council 2001). On October 29, 2001, in press 
remarks following a meeting with senior cabinet members and the new office of homeland 
security, the President stated that, in an effort to combat terrorism, “we're going to be very 
diligent with our visas and observant with the behavior of people who come to this country” (The 
White House Office of the Press Secretary 2001).  
 Discussions of the border and immigration in the months following 9/11 shifted in focus 
to become primarily centered around security concerns. Each of the two subjects was placed 
within the prerogative of fighting terrorism and protecting the country from criminals seeking to 
enter through the immigration system. Bush’s presidency remained largely focused on the “War 
on Terror” and safeguarding against any repetitions of the 9/11 attacks. Nevertheless, even in the 
year following 9/11, Bush attempted to make clear in his public commentary the distinction 
between the terrorists responsible for the attack and the vast majority of immigrants entering the 
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country. In an October 2001 press release on immigration reform, he states: “September the 11th 
taught us an interesting lesson, that while -- by far, the vast majority of people who have come to 
America are really good, decent people, people that we're proud to have here.  There are some 
who are evil.  And our job now is to find the evil ones and to bring them to justice, to disrupt 
anybody who might have designs on hurting -- further hurting Americans” (The White House 
Office of the Press Secretary 2001). Even within this presumably well-intentioned statement, 
however,  Bush implies that the US must fear a portion of immigrants who are “evil.” The 
statement also encapsulates the government’s changing mandate relating to immigration 
following 9/11. What had historically been the task of protecting the American worker through 
immigration policy became the task of “finding the evil ones and bringing them to justice.” 
 Bush’s attempted distinction between dangerous and positive immigrants, however, 
became blurred as the administration continued to promote anti-terrorism efforts and a 
commitment to national security in the wake of 9/11. Those priorities guided the way his 
administration addressed immigration matters and the US-Mexico border during his presidency. 
The slow but significant shift in how immigration, including that of asylum seekers, was viewed 
is evidenced in the transition of immigration matters from the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) to the newly-created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003. The 
transition fortified and institutionalized the connection between immigration and national 
security in the United States. The administration was heavily focused on migration from 
countries in the Middle East, including when discussing people entering at the Southern border. 
Gordon Johndroe, deputy assistant to President Bush, addressed the entrance of Iraqis 
specifically at the Southern border in an August 2007 press conference. Interestingly, he made 
clear during the press conference that a majority of Iraqis crossing the border were applying for 
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asylum and that a smaller group were entering illegally (The White House Office of the Press 
Secretary 2007). In addition to illustrating the focus the administration had on migration from the 
Middle East, this is one of few instances during the Bush presidency in which a member of the 
administration distinguished seeking asylum as a specific and legal means of entry into the 
United States, however briefly.  
The scarcity of direct references to “asylum seekers” specifically is made apparent by the 
content of the Bush White House digital archives. While a search for “immigration” on the 
George Bush White House archives website yields 78,000 results, “border” yields 6,990 results, 
and “refugee” yields 1,519, a search for “asylum” produces only 230 results and “asylum seeker” 
only 38. The shortage of discussion surrounding asylum seekers is disproportionately small 
relative to the fact that approximately 232,204 asylum applications were approved during the 
eight years of the Bush presidency.5 A look at the Obama white house archives reveals a 
continuation of this trend. A total of 41,449 results are produced by a search for “immigration,” 
3,458 for “border,” and 1,156 for “refugee.” Meanwhile, “asylum” yields only 157 results and 
“asylum seeker” only 27.6 
 The Obama administration continued to connect immigration matters to national security 
and, notably, framed and responded to a “large influx” of migrants at the Southern border. The 
fear of foreign terror organizations entering at the Southern border receded, but the idea that 
other types of criminals were crossing remained prevalent. In support of a 2014 border security 
proposal, the White House published a press release stating that the proposal “creates new 
                                               
5 While there are 232,204 recorded approved asylum applications, this is only a small portion of the total 
number of asylum applications filed with the government in that time frame. DHS records used to 
calculate the number of approvals do not report the total numbers of applications received.   
6 It should be noted that searches of the Bush White House yield significant numbers of duplicate results, 
which do not exist in comparable quantities on the Obama website. This is potentially a result of 
technological advancements between the time frames of the two administrations. 
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criminal penalties dedicated to combating transnational criminal organizations that traffic in 
drugs, weapons, and money, and that smuggle people across the borders” (Continuing to 
Strengthen Border Security 2014).  The final part of that statement reveals an emphasized 
attention given to the role of smugglers in the border-crossing process. In statements 
emphasizing deterrence, Press Secretary Josh Earnest warned that “parents who are considering 
putting their children in the hands of a criminal with only the promise that that child will be 
welcome with open arms in America should not do so” (The White House Office of the Press 
Secretary 2014). Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson likewise commented in October 
2014 that the Department had “dedicated resources to the prosecution of the criminal smuggling 
organizations – the Coyotes -- that were inducing people to take the long, dangerous journey 
from Central America” (US Department of Homeland Security Press Office 2014). 
The attention to smugglers grew with the 2014 focus on a “massive influx” of Central 
Americans, particularly children, crossing the border. In the period of May through September, 
2014, the administration focused on convincing the public and congress of the need to allocate 
resources to the Southern border to address the rise in numbers. The political elite spoke about 
the 2014 “influx” as an influx of migrants or of illegal immigrants and largely left out of the 
framing the reasons the asylum seekers had for entering at the border. In a statement on 
immigration in November 2014, President Obama addresses the influx with the following 
statement: 
Today we have more agents and technology deployed to secure our southern border than 
at any time in our history, and over the past 6 years, illegal border crossings have been 
cut by more than half. Although this summer there was a brief spike in unaccompanied 
children being apprehended at our border, the number of such children is now actually 
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lower than its been in nearly 2 years. overall, the number of people trying to cross our 
border illegally is at its lowest level since the 1970s (Obama 2014). 
 
Many of the children to which he is referring arrived for the purpose of seeking asylum. Yet, this 
fact is obscured and instead the reference to the children is preceded and followed by 
commentary on illegal border crossing. The structure and content of the statement clearly 
associates the children and families who entered at the border during the “influx” with illegality.  
While the period of the 2014 “influx” brought the border and those crossing it to national 
attention and forced an increase in discussion of the subject by the political elite, significant 
framings of asylum seekers crossing the Southern border took place throughout the entirety of 
Obama’s presidency. The Office of National Drug Control Policy released statements on the 
Southwest border, describing it as “a major transit zone for drugs, weapons, and money” and 
recognized “the Southwest border’s significance in domestic drug trafficking” (The White House 
Office of Drug Control Policy 2012). In the period between 2001 and 2016 during the Bush and 
Obama administration, asylum seekers were infrequently referenced directly, but were instead 
labeled as “illegal. The Bush administration’s focus on counter-terrorism following September 
11 led to a focus on border security for the purposes of keeping potential terrorists from entering 
at the border. The Obama and Trump administration border policies share the goal of preventing 
members of foreign terrorist organizations from entering through the Southern border, but do not 
prioritize it to the same degree. Rather, they frame  incoming asylum seekers as large “influxes” 
threatening to overwhelm the border and gain illegal entry. 
The current Trump administration framed the entrance of asylum seekers in 2018 in a 
similar fashion as the Obama administration during the 2014 “influx” of people arriving at the 
Southern border. The political elite focused on a “migrant caravan,” composed of people, 
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including many asylum seekers, from Central America. In other ways, the Trump administration 
has deviated from the norms of the two previous administrations. After two years of his 
presidency, the content of the Trump White House website highlights some of those deviations. 
While a search produces 48 results for “immigration,” 125 for “refugee,” 73 for “asylum,” and 
14 for “asylum seeker,” there are 2,083 for “border.” The high number of references to the 
border in his two years when compared to the total number in the eight-year presidential terms of 
his successors displays the heightened attention to the border and those crossing it as a security 
threat. In 2017 and 2018, the political elite framed the border by discussing a need for a “border 
wall” in order to respond to a “crisis at the border.” The current attention by the political elite to 
combatting a surge of people crossing the border is a repetition of the similar situation of 2014, 
now being carried out in a larger scale as the perceived threat of those crossing the border has 
grown over time.  
In its first two years, the Trump administration has maintained the norm of infrequently 
referring to asylum seekers as “asylum seekers.” However, on the occasions that the political 
elite do refer to asylum seekers directly, they have differed from the past in the way that they do 
so. In the past, the political elite typically reassured that those who merited asylum would be 
protected in the midst of necessary border security measures. This was typically coupled with the 
implication that most didn’t truly qualify for asylum. President Trump has been more explicit 
about his negative views of asylum seekers. In June 2018, he stated that “people that come in 
violate the law.  They endanger their children in the process.  And frankly, they endanger all of 
our children” (The White House June 19 2018).  Several months later, he reiterated that “the 
biggest loophole drawing illegal aliens to our borders is the use of fraudulent or meritless asylum 
claims to gain entry into our great country” (The White House Nov. 2018).  In advocating for 
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immigration reform policies, he said “the illegal aliens will no longer get a free pass into our 
country by lodging meritless claims in seeking asylum” (The White House Nov. 2018). Former 
Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly shared the sentiment that most asylum seekers did 
not have credible claims to asylum, saying at a press conference that “the vast majority of the 
people who come up here—in fact I would say the overwhelming number—say exactly the same 
words because they are schooled by the traffickers to say certain words to give certain scenarios 
which generally speaking will get you to remain in the United States in the system because of a 
credible fear claim” (Kelly 2017).  
President Trump has repeatedly stated that gang members, particularly from MS-13, are 
among the primary abusers of the asylum system. In press remarks published by the White house 
on the subject, President Trump stated that, as a result of MS-13 “your sons and daughters are 
attacked violently.  Kids that never even heard of such a thing are being attacked violently, not 
with guns, but with knives because it’s much more painful” (The White House June 19 2018). 
The following statement made by current Secretary of Homeland Security in a June 2018 press 
briefing articulates the current dominant framing of asylum seekers: “The system is broken.  The 
only people that benefit from the system right now are the smugglers, the traffickers, those who 
are peddling drugs, and terrorists” (The White House, June 19 2018). Her remarks encapsulate 
the framings unique to the current administration and those which have persisted over time since 
September 11, 2001. 
How does the Framing of Asylum Seekers Affect Border Militarization? 
 This section will discuss the implications of the dominant framings of asylum seekers by 
the US political elite. The previous section described how asylum seekers who enter the US at 
the Southern border are often depicted as criminals in framing by the political elite. This can be 
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understood most easily through their association with unauthorized migrants. Many references to 
the asylum seekers as criminal is a result of the commonly held belief that the act of crossing the 
border is itself illegal and a crime.7 However, as explained in the description of asylum seekers 
in chapter 1, crossing the border without documentation in order to seek asylum does not hold 
the same legal implications as doing so out of other motivations. Asylum seekers entering at the 
Southern border are further depicted as criminals in framing by public officials through the same 
rhetorical processes which criminalize undocumented immigrants in the US. They are often 
described as rapists and drug dealers and alleged to be committing crimes upon their arrival to 
the country. Statements by members of the political elite have likewise implied that asylum 
seekers may be potential terrorists (Spencer 2008). Associations of asylum seekers to crime and 
drugs typically come about when they are depicted as similar to or the same as unauthorized 
migrants, while fears of terrorism arise from the intense focus on all immigrant groups following 
September 11. 
 Each of the labels of criminal, illegal, drug dealer, and terrorist hold connotations of 
immorality and danger. When the political elite are framing asylum seekers as immoral in ways 
which contradict the imagined values of the nation, increasingly extreme measures to keep them 
from entering the country begin to be viewed as acceptable and appropriate. It is in such an 
environment that the militarization of the Southern border, at which large numbers of asylum 
seekers enter, may be carried out by the US government with some, but relatively little, visible 
opposition or reduction in public support of the government’s actions. The specific types of 
framings of asylum seekers as immoral and threatening to public wellbeing justify militarization 
                                               
7 Illegality and criminality overlap considerably but are in fact not the same concepts. However, the 
distinction between them is not crucial to my argument that they are both associated with immorality. 
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strategies at the border as acceptable means for maintaining safety and upholding the country’s 
value system. 
Dominant Framings and “Wars” of US History  
 Three of the major framings which the political elite use in reference to asylum seekers 
entering the US are that they are terrorists, criminals, and drug traffickers. The power of 
associating asylum seekers with crime, drugs, and terrorism through framing should be 
understood in the specific history of the United States. The three terms, in the US political 
context, are much more than words with negative connotations. Each has been the target of a 
“war” fought against it on both domestic and foreign land in relatively recent US history. The 
“war on crime” of the 1960s, the “war on drugs” of the 70s and 80s,  and the “war on terror” of 
the early 2000s each evoked militaristic sentiment in the general public. Each “war” brought 
about significant changes in the treatment of particular groups by the US government, always out 
of a necessity based upon national security and emergency response. The “wars” also brought 
about moral disengagement, in which the use of war rhetoric sparks fear of war and removes 
questions of morality from peoples’ focus. It thus results in ambivalence rather than moral 
outrage at the knowledge of violence and otherwise unjustifiable action carried out by the state 
(Catledge et al. 2015). Labeling each period of action against crime, drugs, and terrorism as a 
“war” is also an example of symbolic politics. Evidence of the effectiveness of symbolic politics 
for driving public opinion, discussed in detail in Chapter 2, supports the claim that the use of 
symbolic wars when framing the issues of crime, drugs, and terrorism at key points in US history 
produced justification for the government’s militaristic actions (Sears 1993).  
Understanding the sociological mechanisms utilized in the ‘wars’ on crime, drugs, and 
terrorism is important for conceptualizing the effects of all three terms when used in the present. 
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These terms are able to affect Americans in unique ways due to the country’s history and shared 
memory. As a result, even when the political elite do not use the words ‘war’ or ‘military’ in 
their framings of asylum seekers, any of the three key frames discussed may connect the asylum 
seekers to the mentality of war which the frame provokes. The terms “crime,” “drugs,” and 
“terror” were previously associated with militarization, especially within domestic policing, 
during periods of “war.” Since September 11, the political elite using those terms when framing 
asylum seekers has produced a context in which militarization of the Southern border is justified. 
Particularly in the Obama and Trump administrations, another dominant framing of 
asylum seekers entering at the Southern border has been that of a massive “influx,” “surge,” or 
“invasion.” The idea of an invasion at a US land border is immediately associated with the 
situation of being at war. The threat or warning of invasion prompts fear. More importantly than 
prompting fear, however, is the fact that it prompts rapid and extreme response. This is the 
potential effect of framing asylum seekers as invaders quickly approaching our borders. The 
framing goes further than merely influencing public opinion against asylum seekers by also 
serving as a call to action. On its own, the invasion frame of asylum seekers at the border is a 
powerful tool for justifying border militarization. When the invasion frame is paired with the 
criminal, drug trafficking, and terrorist framings associated with historical US “wars,” the 
potential for justifying militarization grows further.  
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a case study focused on the influence of framings of asylum 
seekers on the militarization of the US Southern border. I began the chapter with a brief look at 
the history of immigration and border security in the US, from which I transitioned to an 
overview of the border militarization measures of the past 17 years. I considered the framing of 
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asylum seekers by the political elite as a potential means of justifying increased border 
militarization. The discussion on framing pointed out and addressed the implications of the 
common use of the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘unauthorized’ as synonymous and interchangeable with 
‘asylum seeker.’ It then provided analyses of the prominent framings of asylum seekers. These 
analyses addressed the potential for the framings to portray asylum seekers as security threats 
associated with crime, drugs, and terrorism. Relating to the three framings of asylum seekers as 
criminals, drug smugglers, and terrorists, I considered the effect of the historical “wars” carried 
out against each category in the US. In its entirety, the case study supports the likelihood that the 
framing of asylum seekers was used by the political elite to justify militarization of the US-
Mexico border between 2001 and 2018.  
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Chapter 4: Australia Case Study 
Introduction 
This chapter will undertake a case study of the prominent framings of asylum seekers by 
the Australian political elite. The case study analyzes the influence such framings have on 
justifications for militarizing Australia’s maritime border. The chapter will begin considering 
Australia’s pre-2001 immigration and asylum practices in order to establish the foundation of 
contemporary framings of asylum seekers. It will then consider the increase in border 
militarization in Australia between 2001 and 2018. It will conclude by drawing upon evidence 
from statements by political elites to identify key framings of asylum seekers in the country. The 
overarching goal of the chapter will be to demonstrate how the framing of asylum seekers by the 
political elite in Australia contributes to the justification of border militarization. 
The Pre-2001 History of Immigration and Asylum Policies in Australia 
Following Australia’s independence from Britain in 1901, the first major immigration 
policy in the country was the Immigration Restriction Act (New South Wales Migration Heritage 
Centre 2006). In conjunction with other immigration practices, the Act produced the “White 
Australia” migration period in which the country actively sought to limit non-white, and 
specifically Asian, immigration. The policy was Australia’s reaction to experiences of Chinese 
temporary migration during the “gold years” in Australia. Many Australians viewed Chinese 
migrants as taking the gold wealth of Australia and returning home without contributing to the 
prosperity of the country. A history of worker strikes beginning in the late 1800s, particularly in 
the boating industry, targeted the problem of employers offering jobs to Chinese workers who 
would accept worse conditions and lower wages. As a solution, the Australian government 
removed Chinese workers from the industry and from the Australian workforce more broadly 
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(Dixon 1945). In the early 1900s, which constituted the first decades of Australian independence, 
immigration into the country was regularly limited based on race and nationality, regardless of 
individual circumstance (New South Wales Migration Heritage Centre 2006). During both World 
Wars, potential migrants considered to be from enemy countries were not welcomed in Australia. 
However, rather than being turned away, they were more typically interned upon their arrival. 
During World War II, those individuals interned included Jews fleeing Nazi Germany, as 
they were still recognized as coming from an enemy country at that time. The establishment of 
the United Nations in 1945, of which Australia was a founding Member State, began to shift the 
country's relationship with the outside world, and therein its immigration and asylum policies. 
The first recognized instance of displaced people (DPs) arriving on the shores of Australia took 
place in 1947, when a group from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania arrived in Melbourne (New 
South Wales Migration Heritage Centre 2006). The country did not have a precedent for 
handling the arrival and did not have the legal structures in place for a clear response. The result 
was an eventual agreement that the people would work for the government while receiving 
assistance for two years. This arrangement of two-year contracted labor for displaced arrivals did 
not end with that first group, but became the standard program for DPs entering Australia. 
Standard procedure became that every displaced male entering Australia worked in jobs 
involving physical labor, and every woman, unless pregnant or possessing young children, 
worked in a domestic role. The policy did not account for family unification, so that families 
arriving together after displacement confronted the likelihood of a two-year separation (Dellios 
2016). During that time period, the demographics of the Australian population began to shift 
away from the largely Anglo-Saxon majority the country lauded in the past. While fewer were of 
Caulkins  38 
British heritage, however, most remained white migrants from Eastern European countries 
coming to Australia after being displaced by Soviet invasion and conflict. 
Despite Australia signing onto the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1954, 
the increase in migration numbers came about faster than improvements to the treatment of 
migrants and DPs. “Migration houses” used to house migrants during their obligatory work 
periods often offered poor living conditions. Throughout the 50s and 60s migration became more 
regularized and migrants from non-European countries more accepted. A quota system was 
briefly enforced within immigration policy, but quickly replaced in 1973 by Minister of 
Immigration Al Grassby, a member of the first Labor party government to hold power in nearly 3 
decades. Labeling the quota system and other considerations of country of origin in immigration 
decisions as discriminatory, Grassby enacted new practices of migration based on skill, 
credentials, and market needs (Dellios 2016).  
In 1975, a new group of asylum seekers, now commonly referred to as “boat people,” 
arrived in Australia. Asylum seekers of this type continued to enter primarily by boat after that 
point, mainly coming from East and Southeast Asia. The first arrivals by boat came to Australia 
largely as a result of the Indochinese crisis and included many Vietnamese asylum seekers. By 
the late 1980s, Australia saw asylum seekers from South China and Cambodia (McKay et al. 
2011). The prevailing practice for responding to asylum seekers since the 1970s has been 
internment and detention for at least the period of time in which an asylum application is being 
processed. In 1992, the detention of all unauthorized migrants was made mandatory under 
the  Labor government headed by Prime Minister Paul Keating (Rowe and O’Brien 2016). By 
the late 1990s, the demographics of asylum seekers shifted again, with people coming from Iraq, 
Afghanistan , Sri Lanka, and Pakistan.  
Caulkins  39 
As in the case of the United States, 2001 marked a major transition in the framing of and 
response to asylum seekers entering the country.  This transition is attributed to the events of 
August and September 2001, commonly referenced as the Tampa Affair (McKay et al. 2011, 
McKay et al. 2017). On August 24, 2001, the Norwegian ship MV Tampa rescued 438 asylum 
seekers from a sinking ship en route to Australia. When the Tampa requested to enter Australian 
waters with the asylum seekers on board, the Australian government refused. The asylum seekers 
on the ship threatened suicide and mutiny if the captain were to return them to Indonesia, and the 
Tampa entered into Australian territorial waters in August 29. The government, headed by 
former Prime Minister John Howard, dispatched Special Air Service (SAS)  troops to board the 
ship and prevent it from continuing any further toward Australian shores. It was not until 
September 2 that the Australian government reached an agreement with Nauru and New Zealand 
and allowed the Tampa to bring the asylum seekers to those countries to be processed.  
Border Militarization  
 The Australian government’s response to the Tampa Affair sparked significant 
political debate within the country and around the globe. Following the incident, Australia 
implemented the Pacific Solution, a new policy for responding to asylum seekers arriving by 
boat. The policy established that asylum seekers would be unable to request asylum when 
arriving without authorization at an “offshore” Australian territory. This meant that islands 
outside of mainland Australia would not be an option for asylum seekers arriving by boat. The 
new law also established sites of offshore processing on islands of Nauru and Papua New 
Guinea. This globally controversial practice meant that asylum seekers were housed in often 
overcrowded and inhospitable detention conditions for extended periods while their asylum 
applications were processed. 
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Directly following the Tampa Crisis, the 2001 Border Protection Bill also strengthened 
the power of the Australian government to enforce border protection and, importantly, include 
the military in the enforcement of border security. Since then, the border has become 
increasingly militarized, with the use of more extreme measures of force both when intercepting 
incoming boats of asylum seekers and when handling the asylum seekers in detention centers 
prior to the approval of their asylum cases. Michael Grewcock (2009) describes the situation of 
detention centers housing asylum seekers, describing them as “centres of organized abuse, where 
even young children were drawn into systemic patterns of violence and self harm.” The centers 
were frequent sites of hunger strikes and other forms of protest by the asylum seekers housed in 
them. Each such strike was a response to the poor conditions the asylum seekers were facing 
within. 
Operation Sovereign Borders, initiated in 2013, labeled the entrance of asylum seekers a 
national emergency and assigned the primary responsibility of responding to the Australian 
Defense Force (Emerton and O’Sullivan 2015). The Operation includes a Disruption and 
Deterrence Task Force operated by the Australian Federal Police, as well as a Detention, 
Interception and Transfer Task Force operated by the Maritime Border Command, a joint agency 
composed of the Australian Defense Force and the Australian Border Force. The Department of 
Home Affairs is likewise involved in Processing, Resettlement and Return efforts of Operation 
Sovereign Borders. Australia has thus progressively militarized its maritime border through the 
deployment of troops beginning in 2001 and expanding into the multi-agency Operation 
Sovereign Borders. The consistent presence of military personnel has been coupled with the 
treatment of asylum seekers as enemies and submitting them to inhumane detention conditions.  
Caulkins  41 
Post-2001 Prominent Framings of Asylum Seekers 
 In support of Australia’s actions to prevent the Tampa asylum seekers from arriving on 
Australian land, PM John Howard said “I believe it is in Australia’s national interest that we 
draw a line on what is increasingly becoming an uncontrollable number of illegal arrivals in this 
country” (National Museum Australia 2019). His commentary foreshadowed what would 
become a dominant framing of asylum seekers as illegal and flooding through Australia’s 
maritime borders in unmanageable chaos. The use of the SAS troops to divert the Tampa 
likewise signaled the increased involvement of the military in future border security measures.  
While the Pacific Solution was being finalized and PM Howard was on a diplomatic visit 
to Washington DC, the terrorist attacks of September 11 changed the future of international 
politics. Australia mourned with the rest of the world the deaths of the nearly 3,000 people, 
including 11 Australian nationals, who were lost in the attacks (National Museum Australia 
2019). The country quickly pledged its support in US President Bush’s global “War on Terror.”  
In the years since 2001, the security and moral concerns raised by the Tampa Affair and 9/11 
have continued to shape the framing of asylum seekers entering Australia by boat. As the 
following analysis demonstrates, the way that the Australian political elite have framed “boat 
people” as threatening and immoral has likely contributed to justifying the current militarized 
state of the country’s maritime borders.   
The Line Between Refugee and Asylum Seeker 
One characteristic of the post-2001 framing in Australia is a prominent moral distinction 
between resettled refugees and asylum seekers entering by boat. Australian society, unlike that of 
the US, has a fairly clear understanding of the distinctions between refugees who are resettled 
through UNHCR and people who enter the country to apply for asylum upon arrival. Rather than 
being considered one-and-the-same as refugees entering through resettlement, asylum seekers 
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are negatively framed through their difference from refugees. Refugees who enter through the 
UNHCR resettlement program apply for their status and wait, typically in a refugee camp, prior 
to arriving in the country. Because they enter the country before requesting status, asylum 
seekers who arrive by boat are framed as “queue jumpers” and as less legal and less legitimate in 
comparison to their resettled refugee counterparts. In interviews conducted in the midst of the 
Tampa Affair, PM Howard made various statements explicitly labeling the asylum seekers 
aboard the Tampa as “queue jumpers.” In one statement, he said: “we are a generous people, but 
there are a lot of people waiting in the queue in pitiful conditions in refugee camps all around the 
world and we are happy to do more than our share in taking refugees but they should go through 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees” (Howard & Munro 2001). In another 
interview during that time, he stated “you can't have people pushing their way to the front of the 
queue particularly based on a capacity to buy their passage to this country” (Howard & Mitchell 
2001). This framing imposes a value assessment that these asylum seekers are also less patient, 
less cooperative and less deserving than refugees entering through resettlement.  
 The “queue jumper” framing implies that asylum seekers who arrive by boat are not 
waiting their turn nor following the rules. Existing research describes the framing as ascribing 
negative values and poor moral standing to asylum seekers (Rowe and O’Brien 2016, McKay et 
al. 2017, Hartley and Pederson 2015). Scholars have shown that framing asylum seekers arriving 
by boat as “queue jumpers” is correlated to increased negative perceptions of that group. These 
negative perceptions include feelings of fear or prejudice towards asylum seekers which 
Australians do not feel towards resettled refugees (Hartley and Pederson 2015, Croucamp et al. 
2017). The distinction which has been coined the “good refugee/bad asylum seeker dichotomy” 
has also been shown to increase Australians’ beliefs that asylum seekers are illegitimate or 
Caulkins  43 
illegal. When Prime Minister John Howard spoke about asylum seekers, he frequently 
emphasized that “every person who comes here illegally keeps somebody else out” (Howard & 
Mitchell 2001) and “they must understand that they are coming ahead of people who seek to 
come here in an authorised way” (Interview with Kerry O'Brien ABC 7.30 2005). Scholars have 
extended their analysis to also connect this “queue jumper” framing to the justification of 
militarized measures in response to asylum seekers who enter by boat and/or without 
authorization (Rowe and O’Brien 2016, McKay et al. 2017). As a result, the good refugee/bad 
asylum seeker dichotomy serves an important role in the process of Australian border 
militarization.  
 When prominent framings of asylum seekers by the political elite depict them as morally 
inferior and cheating the system, public perceptions of asylum seekers become increasingly 
negative and/or apathetic. Existing research has already identified a difference between the way 
Australians think about resettled refugees and the way they think about asylum seekers arriving 
by boat, with the latter being significantly more negative (Hartley and Pederson 2015). It has 
likewise connected those negative perceptions of asylum seekers to the ability to justify certain 
types of policy initiatives producing deterrence and punitive measures (Rowe and O’Brien 2016, 
McKay et al. 2017). The general societal understanding that results is that asylum seekers are 
breaking rules and cutting corners. Queue-jumping is additionally a symbol for rude and 
inconsiderate behavior. A symbolic politics approach posits that the symbolic nature of the 
specific phrase “queue-jumper” enhances the frame’s power to impact public opinion. The 
political elite may also frame militarization measures taken against those who “cut the line” as 
efforts to send people to wait their rightful turn rather than as inhumane treatment. This is 
exemplified by PM Julia Gillard’s declaring that “the message is if you do get on a boat, you'll 
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end up at the back of the queue in Malaysia” (Interview with Sabra Lane, ABC AM 2011). This 
is a sentiment she expressed throughout the period of the 2011 Malaysia Swap, in which 
Australia accepted refugees from a Malaysian refugee camp through UNHCR resettlement in 
exchange for the ability to send to Malaysia asylum seekers they intercept attempting entry into 
Australia.  
 Framing asylum seekers as queue jumpers invokes negative public perceptions of asylum 
seekers and diminishes opposition to their mistreatment. This mistreatment includes abuses 
taking place within militarized responses at the border. The political elite utilize the valueless 
queue jumper framing  as an imperative to protect the country not from a physical threat of 
violence or terrorism, but from the threat of moral deterioration which the entrance of asylum 
seekers is presented as producing. The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
humanitarian migration illustrated by the good refugee/bad asylum seeker dichotomy produces 
justification for forceful response against asylum seekers who arrive by boat. The symbolic 
depiction of asylum seekers as queue jumpers puts their morality and value systems into question 
and produces a shared understanding that a superior set of “Australian values” must be protected 
against asylum seeker immorality. 
Asylum-Seekers and People Smuggling 
Asylum seekers are also framed based on their means of arriving to the Australian border. 
As a third party is often involved in transporting the asylum seekers, the Australian government 
has made the issue of asylum seekers also an issue of “people smuggling.” Section 233A of the 
1958 Migration Act defines people smuggling as occurring when a person “organises or 
facilitates the bringing or coming to Australia, or the entry or proposed entry into Australia, of 
another person” wherein the person being transported is not an Australian citizen and has not 
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been granted a legal right to enter the country (Australian Parliament 1958). A focus on people 
smuggling has been utilized to criminalize asylum seekers who arrive by boat by virtue of their 
connection to the crime of smuggling (Muytjens and Ball 2016, McKay et al 2017). 
Criminalization of asylum seekers through such framing began as early as the 1970s under the 
government of PM Malcolm Fraser, and has continued since (Smit 2010). Every administration 
of the 2000’s has addressed the issue of people smuggling, with frequent calls to end the practice 
and “stop the boats.” Prime Minister Kevin Rudd famously stated that "people smugglers are the 
vilest form of human life... and that's why they should rot in jail and in my own view, rot in hell” 
(Rudd & Griffiths 2009) following a series of asylum seeker deaths at sea in 2009. The 
association of criminality and evil with people smuggling meant increased levels of distrust of 
the asylum seekers who are framed as inseparable from people smugglers.  
 While asylum seekers are criticized as accomplices in the crime of people smuggling, 
they are also framed as the victims of their smugglers. Strategies of “compassionate deterrence” 
took hold in the early 2000s, when Australian officials were balancing their interest in stemming 
the entrance of asylum seekers by boat while simultaneously presenting themselves as committed 
to humanitarian efforts. Their messages highlighted the need to eliminate people smuggling 
because they considered it the primary cause of tragic deaths of asylum seekers in failed attempts 
to enter the country. Government officials affirmed that the end of people smuggling would 
mean safer ways for people to gain asylum status. The Australian political elite employed 
similarities in terminology to relate people smuggling to human trafficking, although the two 
crimes are very distinct from one another. This connection resulted in justification for stopping 
asylum seekers entering by boat for the purposes of maintaining law and order and ending the 
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flow of headlines announcing deaths of humanitarian migrants at the country’s shores (McKay et 
al. 2017, Lueck et al. 2015).  
 Asylum seekers and the people smuggling with which they are associated by the political 
elite are also framed as posing a threat to Australia’s sovereignty. Control over entry and exit 
into a country is considered crucial to sovereign power. Illicit migration therefore consistently 
raises the issue of the government's ability to control migration into the country. The Howard 
government of the early 2000s was particularly effective in producing a public fear that people 
smuggling meant taking control of the country away from its leaders. He frequently warned that 
the people smugglers were trying to decide who should enter Australia, but that ultimately the 
Australian government needed to maintain control and decide who to allow in (Peterie 2016).  
 The association of asylum seekers with people smuggling has the potential to influence 
border militarization in several respects. Firstly, the criminalization turns public attitudes against 
asylum seekers and reduces any protest of militarized force in response. The “boat people” 
against whom Australian naval officers are fighting cease to be recognized by the public as 
humanitarian victims but as criminals. Secondly, and paradoxically, the characterization of 
people smugglers as victimizing asylum seekers calls for swift action by any means necessary to 
put an end to the practice. Any victimization of asylum seekers at the hands of the Australian 
border patrol and military may be overlooked due to the perception that smugglers are the 
ultimate evil-doers. The Australian government is using the evil nature of people smuggling to 
keep asylum seekers from attempting to enter. This approach is evidenced by the Australian 
government’s production and distribution of materials telling potential asylum seekers that they 
should not attempt to pay “people smugglers” for assistance entering the country by boat (Figure 
1). Lastly, the threat against state sovereignty and the fear of a loss of control implies the threat 
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of impending chaos should the government be unsuccessful in reclaiming its power over who it 
allows to enter its territory. Drastic measures in the form of border militarization become 
palatable and potentially even seen as necessary when framing by the political elite encourages 
hatred and fear of people smuggling and, by association, incoming asylum seekers.  
 
Figure 1: Material Distributed by Australian Government8 
Conclusion 
The case study of Australia carried out in this chapter illustrates that the prominent 
framings of asylum seekers in the country contribute to the justification for militarization of the 
border. The political elite distinguish asylum seekers from refugees who enter through 
resettlement in order to cast asylum seekers as less genuine and as queue jumpers whose 
                                               
8 Image source: https://www.australiantimes.co.uk/news/no-way-asylum-posters-draw-criticism/ 
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disregard for the rules and refusal to wait their turn make them a threat to an imagined set of 
Australian values. Framings criminalizing asylum seekers by highlighting their connection to 
people smuggling likewise facilitates negative public opinion and an allowance for militarized 
measures to fight the criminal activity of smuggling and protect Australian sovereignty and 
stability.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Introduction 
This chapter will discuss key similarities and differences between the two case studies of 
the US and Australia. It will consider the implications of the similarities and differences 
identified. In the chapter, I will articulate that the case studies support the argument that the 
political elite use framings of asylum seekers to justify border militarization in the US and 
Australia. I will conclude by identifying the limitations of this thesis and discussing the 
relevance of the findings for future research.   
Comparing the US and Australia Case Studies  
Types of Framing 
 
Figure 2: Similarities and Differences in Framings 
The ways in which the political elite frame specific asylum seekers in both the US and 
Australia are tailored to the countries’ histories and societal norms. Nevertheless, there are clear 
similarities between the types of framings that are used in both countries. Figure 2 illustrates the 
country-specific and shared framings I identified in the case studies. In addition to several 
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differences between the two case studies, many of the shared framings are experienced 
differently or to different degrees within the two countries.  
The political elite in both countries frequently use framings of asylum seekers as national 
security threats. Within the security threat framework, the political elite in both the US and 
Australia highlight fears that international terrorist groups will abuse immigration pathways to 
enter the countries. Using the framing of asylum seekers as terrorists also connects asylum 
seekers to the rhetoric of the US “war on terror,” which Australia supported in the years 
following 9/11. In the war on terror, US government officials justified military action abroad and 
militarization domestically in the name of counter-terrorism, and the Australian government used 
counterterrorism to justify military participation in the “global war on terror.” When the political 
elite frame asylum seekers as criminals and potential terrorists to be feared, they likewise justify 
militarized responses to asylum seekers arriving at the borders.  
Additionally, the political elite in both the US and Australia label asylum seekers “illegal 
immigrants.” The political elite and members of the public in both countries associate illegal 
immigrants with economic burdens in the forms of taking jobs from citizens, avoiding taxes, and 
using publicly funded resources such as public school systems. The governments of each country  
consider the ability of immigrants to illegally enter the borders as a threat to sovereignty as the 
government is no longer in charge of who may enter and reside in the country. In instances of a 
declared “flood,” “influx,” or “surge” in incoming asylum seekers, the political elite were 
particularly adamant about the danger the asylum seekers posed to maintaining border control. In 
those instances, and through the framing of asylum seekers as illegal immigrants threatening the 
right of the national government to regulate entry, the political elite justified border militarization 
measures in the US and Australia. 
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While political elite in both the US and Australia raise concerns about the smuggling of 
persons across their borders, the framing has become more central in the immigration rhetoric of 
Australia than in the US. “People smugglers” are regularly referenced by the political elite, to the 
point that it is a common phrase among both the political elite and the Australian public. “People 
smuggling” and the need to end it is often discussed with no mention of “asylum seekers” or 
other words referencing the people fleeing violence and persecution. In the United States, the 
smugglers - colloquially called “coyotes” - are also discussed, but the terms used to describe 
them do not appear as frequently and are not part of public common knowledge in the same 
manner as “people smuggling rhetoric” in Australia. When smuggling of asylum seekers has 
been given more attention than normal, it is done when placing excessive blame and accusation 
on asylum seekers would be politically damaging, such as when the asylum seekers crossing the 
border are mostly children. Despite the different degrees to which the political elite frame 
asylum seekers in relation to smuggling in the two countries, the results in each are similar. 
Framing asylum seekers using rhetoric of smuggling places the asylum seeker in the position of 
the victim, implying that they do not have agency and are dependent upon their smuggler in a 
pattern of dependency which will persist into their becoming dependents of the host country 
government and become an economic burden should they be allowed to enter. At the same time, 
linking asylum seekers to smugglers associates them with crime, questions their morality based 
on their decision to participate in and fund “people smugglers,” and implies that they are not 
genuinely in need of asylum since they are financially able to pay a smuggler to assist them. 
The divergence in the way that the political elite in the US and Australia frame asylum 
seekers as related to illegal drugs is also telling. In the US, the framings of asylum seekers as 
drug smugglers, drug traffickers, and drug dealers produces a context in which drugs crossing 
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the Southern border and people crossing the Southern border become indistinguishable. The 
implication of the drug framing in the US is that the political elite justify border militarization by 
establishing that the government must restrict people crossing the border in order to restrict 
illegal drugs crossing the border. In Australia, the political elite do not connect any group of 
incoming immigrants to the problem of illegal drugs entering the border. The entrance of illegal 
drugs is a customs issue which has not been made an immigration issue. This thesis does not 
answer the question of why this difference in framing exists. However, a potential reason may be 
that drugs crossing land borders holds different connotations and produces different responses 
than do drugs crossing maritime borders or arriving via air travel. Another explanation may be 
differences in the prevalence of drug use within the US and Australian population. Future 
research can continue to explore the reasons for the difference in framings and perceptions of 
incoming drugs in the US and Australia  
Another key distinction between the two cases worthy of further exploration is the 
Australian notion of asylum seekers as “queue jumpers” and the good refugee/bad asylum seeker 
dichotomy. This dichotomy is based on an understanding by the political elite and the Australian 
public of the differences between the legal processes of applying for asylum versus registering 
for  refugee resettlement with UNHCR. This clear recognition of the difference between asylum 
and refugee resettlement processes does not exist in the United States. Instead, the US political 
elite and public talk about asylum seekers and resettled refugees as one-and-the-same while also 
labeling asylum seekers crossing at the Southern border as illegal immigrants. This thesis 
discusses the use of the “queue jumper” rhetoric by the political elite for the justification of 
border militarization. However, the research does not venture into determining the reasons for 
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the differences in how US and Australian citizens and political elite understand the relationship 
between the asylum process and refugee resettlement. 
Finally, some terms used in the US and Australia when framing asylum seekers differs by 
country, such as the “caravan” framing in the US and the “boat people” rhetoric in Australia. 
Nevertheless, the terminologies share the characteristic of dehumanizing asylum seekers. The 
dehumanization of asylum seekers through framing is a common theme between the two case 
studies and is an essential component of the process by which the political elite justify increased 
border militarization in each country. 
Border Militarization 
The use of framings which dehumanize asylum seekers, create a fear of their presence, 
and portray them as an enemy in styles reminiscent of wartime invasions serves as justification 
for continued militarization of borders in both the US and Australia. The increasing intensity of 
border militarization in each country is demonstrated by the growth of immigration patrol 
officers stationed at the borders as well as the presence of military personnel at borders, 
including during specific military operations at the borders. The US government has carried out 
border-focused military operations throughout the period following 9/11, beginning in 2003 with 
the deployment of troops to the Southern border under Operation Liberty Shield. In 2018, the 
Trump administration carried out similar military deployment under Operation Faithful Patriot 
and Operation Guardian Support. Australia shares the experience of military operations within 
the realm of border security. Operation Sovereign Borders is the Australian naval Operation 
which began in 2013 and continues in 2019 at the time this thesis is being written. It deploys the 
Australian Navy to intercept boats bringing asylum seekers to Australian territory by sea.  
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Beyond incorporating military personnel into border security operations, the US and 
Australia each militarize their borders by incorporating military-grade strategies and 
technologies. In both countries, the principal agencies responsible for border protection, the US 
Customs and Border Protection and the Australian Border Force, have dramatically changed in 
the past 18 years. The training for border patrol has developed to closely resemble that of the 
militaries, including combat training. The border patrol agencies of both countries have also 
initiated the use of military grade technology, including radar detection, security cameras and 
fencing. In the case of Australia, that technology has expanded to the technological advancement 
of the naval ships used for the protection of the sea border and the country’s ocean territory.  
Key Events in 2001 
A final unique comparison between the US and Australia is between the two specific 
historical events which have come to shape the framing of asylum seekers and the militarization 
of borders in each country. In the United States, the events of 9/11 are regularly cited as a turning 
point in attitudes towards immigration overall. It has further been cited as influencing decisions 
about whether to permit asylum seekers and refugees into the country. While there were 
concerns connected to immigration policies and the asylum process prior to 9/11, the fear of 
security breaches through immigration pathways escalated following the event. The political 
elite’s focus on the Southern border and those crossing it intensified following 9/11, and 
militarization measures have increased since. In Australia, the most-cited incident relating to 
asylum seekers is the 2001 Tampa Crisis, in which the Australian government refused to accept 
433 asylum seekers the Norwegian freighter Tampa had rescued at sea. 9/11 and the Tampa 
Crisis occurred within weeks of one another, and their chronological proximity makes the 
comparison of the two cases particularly interesting and unique. Apart from their chronological 
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proximity, however, the Tampa Affair and 9/11 were extremely different events. The fact that 
the two events have shared similar roles as catalysts for change in framings of asylum seekers 
and border militarization raises further questions. 
Limitations and Future Research 
I will continue by discussing several limitations of the research. First, while there is 
evidence for the likelihood of a causal connection between the framing of asylum seekers and 
border militarization in both the US and Australia, this thesis does not intend to show nor does it 
result in a causal connection between the framing of asylum seekers and border militarization. 
Rather, the research reveals that the framing of asylum seekers by the political elite in the US 
and Australia likely contributes to justifying border militarization. 
Second, the reader should also recognize that the findings in this thesis are based on 
thorough research on the US and Australia and are not automatically applicable to any other 
countries. However, the methodology and form of analysis undertaken in this thesis may be 
applied to research on other countries to determine whether framings of asylum seekers by the 
political elite are used to justify border militarization beyond the US and Australian contexts.  
Future research could also determine if there are important relationships between framings of 
asylum seekers and border militarization in other countries which are not present in the US and 
Australian cases. 
Third, while this thesis establishes the likelihood that framings of asylum seekers are 
used to justify border militarization, it does not claim that these framings are the only ways by 
which the political elite justify border militarization. There are likely additional factors, 
including other forms of rhetoric and underlying racial biases, which contribute to the 
justification of border militarization. International pressures also likely contribute to perceptions 
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of immigrants and border militarization in both the US and Australia. The focus of the thesis is 
on the ability of framings by the political elite to justify border militarization. As such, it does 
not discuss the international and domestic pressures and outside influences which shape those 
framings.  
Conclusion  
This thesis explores the framing of asylum seekers by the political elite in the US and 
Australia and considers the potential of that framing to justify increased border militarization in 
the two countries. It does so through individual case studies highlighting the central framings of 
asylum seekers in the two countries and the ability of the framings to justify border 
militarization. In each case study, I show that the political elite’s framings of asylum seekers 
likely serves as justification for border militarization measures. The case studies also provide 
evidence that the framings of asylum seekers to justify border militarization have contributed to 
the overall increase in border militarization observed in both the US and Australia since 2001. 
Overall, the thesis supports that the framing of asylum seekers by political elites in the US and 
Australia contributes to the justification of border militarization measures within each country.  
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